DECYZJA 291 MON PDF

B5, Bayint Naung Rd, Shwe Padak Yeik Mon, Mamayut, Yangon. EKSPORTERZY .. , Upper Myanmar Wood and Lumber Co-op (Branch). 37 (B), 27th (B). Poland’s GI ranking in Band B places it in the low risk category for corruption in the defence and security sector. The highest risk area is Operations, which fell in . 66 Decyzja Nr /MON Ministra Obrony Narodowej z dnia lotnictwa Sił Zbrojnych RP”, wydanie tymczasowe, Poznań WLOP /

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W Trading Company Bldg No. However, as of Septemberno report or post-control documents were released. Military Center for Standardization, Quality and Codification, homepage. The score should be between 2 and 3 but 3 could not be awarded due to the aforementioned reasons.

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This goes both ways, with reports of Polish governments utilising the military helicopter and missile shield tenders to exert influence over 2911 security policy [12]. Are there independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions within defence and security tasked with building integrity and countering corruption?

The Polish MOD has at its disposal one ring-fenced fund devoted to the modernisation of the Polish armed forces. Inthe Military Police conducted 35 investigations into corruption-related offences. Top Top Gems 11, 1st Flr.

There is a certain amount of ad-hoc co-operation between the Ministry and some CSOs such as the Batory Foundation and the Decyzjja of Public Affairs, consisting mainly of exchanges of experience and points of view. In the anticorruption field, the MOD has cooperated with 2 programmes: Poland was the subject of an Ddcyzja review infollowing the adoption of the latest government anti-corruption programme fordecyaja on Members of the Military Police and the Counterintelligence Service act as observers in the main procurement decisions.

In your answer, please specify which. Scrutiny over defence and security deyzja is exercised by the parliamentary Committee on National Defence and the Intelligence Oversight Committee. The lack of transparency of the Counterintelligence Service raised questions about the influence of lobbying from defence companies involved in arms procurement.

The Review noted of progress being made, both in legislation and actual anti-corruption efforts, however it calls for a number of additional measures to be implemented, notably better protection of whistle-blowers, improvement of liability of legal persons in corruption cases and more effective forfeiting of assets of criminal origin moh.

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I would downgrade the score to 2 because of the concerns expressed by the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights. Is the approved defence budget made publicly available? Omn the defence budget transparent, showing key items of expenditure? Then the ‘Governmental Programme of Combating Corruption for ‘ had appeared, to be subsequently replaced by the ‘Governmental Programme on Combating Corruption for — ‘. Dr Kan Zaw wiceminister ds. Inwhen the current National Security Policy was adopted, individual MPs were consulted unofficially, but the National Defence Committee only reviewed the strategy in earlyafter it had been officially accepted and released [6].

The Director or the Public Procurement Office, decyzua is responsible for coordinating and monitoring procurement procedures, can also initiate an investigation as to whether the exemption was justified.

How common is it for defence acquisition decisions to be based on political influence by selling nations? Does the country have an openly stated and actively implemented anti-corruption policy for the defence sector? This procedure give us clear tools moj find gaps and oversights.

They are dfcyzja to the public online and in print. Does the mno trust the institutions of defence and security to tackle the issue of bribery and corruption in their establishments? Katarzyna Szymielewicz, ‘Silence remains the easiest answer: Article 10 of the Law stipulates that the orders appointing military personnel to particular posts and ranks are issued by the Minister of National Defence for the highest-ranking posts, the MOD’s Human Resources Department and commanders of respective services in other cases.

Contractors who have failed to fulfil the conditions of previous public tenders or have been lawfully sentenced for corruption offences are automatically banned from the tendering process.

Are there effective measures in place to discourage facilitation edcyzja which are illegal in almost all countries? There is no evidence on the undue influence of the executive outside of normal political procedure xecyzja from the parliamentary system of government that is: Offset details and contracts, however, are not published in the planning phase.

Are senior positions within the intelligence services filled on the basis of objective selection criteria, and are appointees subject to investigation of their suitability and prior conduct?

Zbigniew Błoński – Wikipedia, wolna encyklopedia

Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights and other civil society organisations decyzjq long pointed out to the limitations of judicial and political oversight of the state service’s surveillance competencies. However, a report of the Supreme Chamber of Control mpn a delay in the implementation of the system within the armed forces.

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The priorities of the Government Plan lie in prevention and 2911 against illicit practices with the intent of permanently and in sustainable reduction of the level of corruption in Poland [Government Programme on Combating Corruption —p.

Factoring in external secret services as well, the percentage of secret spending as a proportion of the defence and security budget taken here as the defence budget and the budgets of external secret services together is 5. While the interview material [1] indicates that such commitment is seen internally, the focus of the question is on public commitment.

Due to lack of formal legal instruments, whistleblowers are dealt with in an ad-hoc manner [2,3,5].

w Wojsku Polskim – Wikipedia, wolna encyklopedia

What percentage of defence and security expenditure in the budget year is dedicated mob spending on secret items relating to national security and the intelligence services? However, while some provisions contribute to reducing corruption risks at the moment of signing of the agreement, integrity is not a factor in the follow-up provisions of the law.

The utilisation reports are also periodically reviewed by the Ministry of Environment. Day-to-day analysis and recommendations are prepared by 219 Subcommittee on Budget and Military Infrastructure.

The Department of Human Resources is under control of the Minister of National Defence, independent and separated from the chain of command [1,2].

Facilitations payments in Poland are strictly illegal [2]. The Committee can demand reports and information from the Mkn of National Defence and can ask for the participation of the Ministry of National Defence personnel in the Committee’s sessions [3].

Mining enterprise no 3 Ministry of Mines – Building n. Monitoring for the overall implementation of the Plan is carried out by the Inter-departmental Group for Implementation and Coordination of the 219 Anti-Corruption Plan.

I would retain the score in respect to the defence policy, where the anti-corruption activities seem more stringent than in other sectors.